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In the present paper the idea of Wang [G.J. Wang, Theory of truth degrees of formulas in
Łukasiewicz n-valued propositional logic and a limit theorem, Sci. China Inform. Sci. E 35(6) (2005)
561–569 (in Chinese)] is ﬁrstly extended to the n-valued R0-logic Ln and the concept of truth degrees
of formulas inLn is proposed.A limit theorem saying that the truth function sn induced by truth degrees
converges to the integrated truth function s when n converges to inﬁnity is obtained. This theorem
builds a bridge between discrete valued R0-logic and continuous valued R0-logic. Secondly, based
on deduction theorem, completeness theorem and the concept of truth degrees of formulas in Ln,
the concept of consistency degrees of theories is given. It is proved that a theory C over Ln is a useless
theory(i.e., the deductions of C are all tautologies) iﬀ the consistency degree consistn(C) of C is equal to
1, C is consistent iﬀ 1
2
6 consistnðCÞ 6 1, and C is inconsistent iﬀ consistn(C) = 0. Lastly, the concept of
consistency degrees of theories is generalized and a method of graded reasoning in Ln is obtained.
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Whether a theory (i.e., a set of formulas) is consistent or not is one of the crucial ques-
tions in any logic system. The reason is that in classical logic, a contradictory theory (i.e., a
theory which is not consistent) proves anything. The same result also holds in fuzzy and
many-valued logic systems in which the interpretation of the logical implication satisﬁes
0! x = 1, where 0, x, and 1 are truth values [4]. Moreover, how to measure the extent
to which a theory is consistent is also one of the crucial questions in logic systems. For
trying to grade the extent of consistency of diﬀerent theories, many authors have proposed
diﬀerent methods in fuzzy (continuous valued) logic systems and have obtained many
good results [3,7,13,21,19,20,17]. Especially in [20], the authors, from logical point of view
and based on deduction theorems, completeness theorems and the concept of truth degrees
of formulas, introduced, in classical and fuzzy propositional logic systems, a more natural
and reasonable deﬁnition of consistency degrees of theories. In other words, we have stud-
ied successfully the consistency of theories where the set of truth values jumped from {0,1}
to [0,1]. A natural question then arises: How do we harmoniously ﬁll in the gap of consis-
tency of theories between classical and fuzzy logic systems? That is to say, how do we
establish the concept of consistency degrees of theories in n-valued logic systems such that
it approximates the consistency of theories in fuzzy logic system when n turns to inﬁnity,
and it takes the classical case as a special case when n = 2?
In order to put fuzzy reasoning on a solid foundation, the second author proposed in
1997 a new formal deductive system L (also called R0-logic) and a kind of new algebraic
structures, called R0-algebras (see [12,14]). To formalize the logic of nilpotent minimums,
Esteva and Godo introduced in 2001 a nilpotent minimum logic, NM for short (NM is a
schematic extension of the Monoidal t-norm based logic, MTL for short, as the logic of
left-continuous t-norms, see [1]). So far the authors of [8,6] have proved that NM and
L are equivalent and NM-algebras and R0-algebras are the same algebraic structures.
It is proved also that L is standard complete [10] (or see [1] for the standard completeness
of NM) and the n-valued R0-logic Ln is also complete with respect to the standard n-valued
R0-algebra Rn (see [11]). Moreover, the R0-logic L has another good property that the
structure of its generalized deduction theorem (C [ {A} ‘ B iﬀ C ‘ A2! B, see Theorem
2.4) is decided. Therefore we try to choose the n-valued R0-logic Ln to answer the question
above. As we will see from the paper, the presented results can be easily adapted also to
each ﬁnite-valued Łukasiewicz logic, Łn for short, which is standard complete with respect
to the standard MVn-chain [2].
The present paper is arranged like this: In Section 2, we recall the presentation of the n-
valued R0-logic Ln including syntax and semantics, and deduction theorem and complete-
ness theorem. In Section 3, we, based on the measure theory on the set Xn of all valuations
from the set F(S) of all formulas into the set of truth values, introduce the concept of truth
degrees of formulas in Ln as done in Łukasiewicz n-valued logic system [15]. With the con-
cept of truth degrees of formulas, we propose successfully in Section 4, the concept of con-
sistency degrees of theories after taking on a deep analysis on what it means for a theory to
be inconsistent. The idea of the present paper has a good intuitive meaning, and it can be
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method of graded reasoning in Ln. We will discuss this issue in Section 5. The last part,
Section 6, is some conclusion summarizing the results and outlining problems and further
research topics.
2. Preliminaries
First let us recall the formal deduction system L (also called R0-logic) proposed by the
second author in 1997 [12], which is proved now equivalent to the nilpotent minimum
logic, NM for short, introduced by the authors of [1].
Deﬁnition 2.1 [14]. Suppose that S = {p1,p2, . . .} is a countable set of propositional
variables. The set F(S) of well-formed formulas over L is deﬁned inductively as follows:
each propositional variable p 2 S is a formula; if A and B are formulas, then :A, A _ B
and A! B are formulas, where : is a unary operator, and _ and ! are binary ones
respectively.
The simpliﬁed axiom schemes of L given in [14] are as follows:
ðL1Þ A! ðB! A ^ BÞ ðL6Þ A! A _ B
ðL2Þ ð:A! :BÞ ! ðB! AÞ ðL7Þ A _ B! B _ A
ðL3Þ ðA! ðB! CÞÞ ! ðB! ðA! CÞÞ ðL8Þ ðA! CÞ ^ ðB ! CÞ ! ðA _ B ! CÞ
ðL4Þ ðB! CÞ ! ððA ! BÞ ! ðA! CÞÞ ðL9Þ ðA ^ B! CÞ ! ðA! CÞ _ ðB ! CÞ
ðL5Þ A! ::A ðL10Þ ðA ! BÞ _ ððA! BÞ ! :A _ BÞ
where A ^ B ¼ :ð:A _ :BÞ.
The deduction rule of L is Modus Ponens (brieﬂy, MP): from A and A! B infer B.Remark 2.2. (i) To formalize the logic of nilpotent minimum t-norms, Esteva and Godo
introduced, in 2001, a nilpotent minimum logic, NM for short, which is a schematic
extension of the Monoidal t-norm based logic, MTL for short, as the logic of left-contin-
uous t-norms [1]. But now Pei, and Liu and Li have proved in [8] and [6] respectively, the
equivalence of NM and L.
(ii) The connectives :;_ and ! in L are not independent,Wang et al. proved in [18]
that A _ B is an abbreviation of :ððððA ! ðA ! BÞÞ ! AÞ ! AÞ ! :ððA ! BÞ ! BÞÞ
under provable equivalence, A, B 2 F(S).Deﬁnition 2.3. In L.
(i) A subset C of F(S) is called a theory.
(ii) Let C be a theory, A 2 F(S). A deduction of A from C, in symbols, C ‘ A, is a ﬁnite
sequence of formulas A1, . . . ,An = A such that for each 1 6 i 6 n, either Ai is an
axiom, or Ai 2 C, or there are j, k 2 {1, . . . , i  1} such that Ai follows from Aj
and Ak by MP. Equivalently, we say that A is a consequence of C. The set of all con-
sequences of C is denoted by D(C). By a proof of A we shall henceforth mean a
deduction of A from the empty set. We shall also write ‘A in place of ; ‘ A and
A will be called to be a theorem.
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equivalent.
(iv) A theory C  F(S) is called inconsistent if C ‘ 0, otherwise, consistent, where 0 is a
refutable formula (or contradiction), i.e., ‘ :0 holds.
The classical deduction theorem is one of the most important theorem in classical two-
valued logic system, and it says that
C [ fAg ‘ B iff C ‘ A ! B.
Because the left-to-right direction of the classical deduction theorem above depends on the
following axiom of classical logic:
ðA ! ðB ! CÞÞ ! ððA ! BÞ ! ðA ! CÞÞ;
which is not assumed in L, it is no longer valid in L. Fortunately, it has been proved that
there exists in L a weak form of the deduction theorem (here called generalized deduction
theorem) [9].Theorem 2.4 [9]. Suppose that C is a theory, A, B 2 F(S), then in L holds the following
generalized deduction theorem:
C [ fAg ‘ B iff C ‘ A2 ! B
where A2 ¼ A&A ¼ :ðA ! :AÞ.
It is easy to check that (A&B)! C and A! (B! C) are provably equivalent, hence by
the deﬁnition of deduction, the above generalized deduction theorem in L can be de-
scribed equivalently as:
C ‘ A iff 9A1; . . . ;Am 2 C; s.t. ‘ A21&   &A2m ! A.
The following is about the semantics of L.
Let N : [0, 1]! [0, 1] be a strong negation (i.e., an involutive function such that
N(0) = 1). Deﬁne a binary operator N : [0,1]2! [0, 1] as follows:
x N y ¼
x ^ y; y > NðxÞ;
0; otherwise,

where x ^ y = min(x,y), x, y 2 [0, 1]. The operator N is called a nilpotent minimum.
Clearly, the operator N is a left-continuous t-norm, thus we can obtain the corre-
sponding residuum of N RN : [0, 1]! [0,1] as follows:
RN ðx; yÞ ¼
1; x 6 y;
NðxÞ _ y; otherwise,

where x _ y = max(x,y), x, y 2 [0,1]. Particularly, if N is a standard strong negation
: : ½0; 1 ! ½0; 1;:x ¼ 1 x, then the operator N is called the standard nilpotent mini-
mum, and we obtain the so-called R0 implication operator and the corresponding t-norm
(see [12,14]):
R0ðx; yÞ ¼
1; x 6 y;
ð1 xÞ _ y; otherwise,

x y ¼ x ^ y; xþ y > 1;
0; otherwise:

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bra, the second author proposed the R0-algebra [14], which is an algebraic structure equiv-
alent to NM-algebra [1].
Deﬁnition 2.5 [14]. LetM be an algebra of type ð:;_;!Þ, where : is a unary operator, _
and ! are binary operations. If there is a partial order 6 such that (M,6) is a bounded
lattice, _ is the supremum operation with respect to 6, : is an order-reversing involution,
and the following conditions hold for any x, y, z 2M.
ðR1Þ :x ! :y ¼ y ! x ðR2Þ 1! x ¼ x; x ! x ¼ 1
ðR3Þ y ! z 6 ðx! yÞ ! ðx ! zÞ ðR4Þ x! ðy ! zÞ ¼ y ! ðx ! zÞ
ðR5Þ x! ðy _ zÞ ¼ ðx ! yÞ _ ðx ! zÞ; x! ðy ^ zÞ ¼ ðx ! yÞ ^ ðx ! zÞ
ðR6Þ ðx! yÞ _ ððx! yÞ ! ð:x _ yÞÞ ¼ 1For example, deﬁne on [0,1] a unary operator and two binary operator as follows:
:x ¼ 1 x; x _ y ¼ maxfx; yg; x ! y ¼ R0ðx; yÞ. Then ð½0; 1;:;_;!Þ is a R0-algebra,
called the standard R0-algebra. The ﬁnite set f0; 1n1 ; . . . ; n2n1 ; 1g with the operations:;_;! as deﬁned in the standard R0-algebra is also a R0-algebra, denoted by Rn.Deﬁnition 2.6. Let ð½0; 1;:;_;!Þ be the standard R0-algebra, A 2 F(S).
(i) A homomorphism v : F(S)! [0, 1] of type ð:;_;!Þ from F(S) into the standard
R0-algebra, i.e., vð:AÞ ¼ :vðAÞ; vðA _ BÞ ¼ vðAÞ _ vðBÞ; vðA ! BÞ ¼ vðAÞ ! vðBÞ ¼
R0ðvðAÞ; vðBÞÞ, is called a valuation of F(S). The set of all valuations will be denoted
by X.
(ii) A formula A is called a tautology if "v 2 X, v(A) = 1. A is called a contradiction if
"v 2 X, v(A) = 0.
It has been proved that the algebraic semantic and the syntax of L are in perfect
harmony, i.e. the standard completeness theorem holds in L.
Theorem 2.7 [10]. "A 2 F(S) in L, A is a theorem iff A is a tautology.
To grade the truth degrees of formulas in L, the second author proposed the concept
of integrated truth degrees of formulas [16].
Let A = A(p1, . . . ,pm) be a formula of R0-logic whose all propositional variables are
among p1, . . . ,pm. Then the value of A(x1, . . . ,xm) is obtained from the truth valuations
v(pi) = xi, i = 1, . . . ,m, in [0,1] using the homomorphism v. For example, if A ¼ p1_
p2 ! :p3, then A(x1,x2,x3) = (x1 _ x2)! (1  x3) = R0((x1 _ x2), 1  x3). It must be
stressed that this has sense only in standard semantics of R0-logic (luckily, this logic, more
precisely the NM-logic, is standard complete).
Deﬁnition 2.8 [16]. Suppose that A(p1, . . . ,pm) is a formula in L, deﬁne
sðAÞ ¼
Z 1
0
  
Z 1
0|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
m-times
Aðx1; . . . ; xmÞdx1    dxm;
then s(A) is called the integrated truth degree of A.
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plus
(L*11) An
(ii) The axioms of the (2n + 2)-valued R0 logic L2nþ2 are those of L plus
(L*12) Bn+1
ðL15Þ ðA ! :AÞ ^ ð:A ! AÞ ! ðA _ :AÞwhere
A1 ¼ :C1 _ ððC1 ! :C1Þ ! ð:C1 ! C1ÞÞ;
Akþ1 ¼ ðCkþ1 ! AkÞ _ Ckþ1; k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;
B1 ¼ C1 _ :C1;
Bkþ1 ¼ ðCkþ1 ! BkÞ _ Ckþ1; k ¼ 1; 2; . . . .
and {Cn} is an arbitrary sequence of formulas.
If it is not necessary to state whether n is odd or even, we denote the above extension by
Ln; nP 2. The inference rule of Ln is MP.
The deﬁnitions of theories, theorems and deductions of Ln are almost the same as those
of L. For example, a theory C over Ln is a set of formulas. C ‘ A (or, more precisely,
C ‘n A) means that A is provable in C, i.e., there is a Ln-proof in C (a ﬁnite sequence each
of whose members either is an axiom of Ln, or an element of C or follows from some
preceding members by MP.) Moreover, since Ln is an extension of L, the generalized
deduction theorem of L also holds in Ln, i.e., C [ {A} ‘n B iff C ‘n A2! B.
The set of truth values over Ln is the n-valued R0-algebra Rn. A homomorphism
v : F(S)! Rn is called a valuation of F(S) in Ln. The set of all valuations is denoted by Xn.
A formula A is called a tautology if "v 2 Xn, v(A) = 1. A and B are called logically
equivalent if "v 2 Xn, v(A) = v(B). Similarly for a formula A = A(p1, . . . ,pm) 2 F(S), A
induces a function A : Rmn ! Rn in the natural way.
D.W. Pei and S.M. Wang has now proved that Ln is complete w.r.t. Rn [11].Theorem 2.10 [15]. LnðnP 2Þ is complete, i.e., "A 2 F(S),
A is a theorem iff A is a tautology.3. Truth degrees of formulas in Ln
In this section we extend the idea of [15] to Ln and introduce the concept of truth
degrees of formulas in Ln.
Suppose that Xk ¼ f0; 1n1 ; . . . ; n2n1 ; 1g and lk is the evenly distributed probability mea-
sure on Xk, i.e., lkð;Þ ¼ 0;lkðX kÞ ¼ 1; lkð in1Þ ¼ 1n ; i ¼ 0; . . . ; n 1; k ¼ 1; 2; . . . . Assume
that X ¼ Q1k¼1X k and l is the inﬁnite product of l1,l2, . . . [5].
Let v 2 Xn, then v is determined by its restriction vjS because F(S)/ (where  is the
relation of ‘‘logical equivalence in the logic L’’) is the free algebra generated by S. Assume
that v(pk) = vk (k = 1,2, . . .), then an inﬁnite dimensional vector v
!¼ ðv1; v2; . . .Þ in
X ¼ Q1k¼1X k is obtained. Conversely, let v!¼ ðv1; v2; . . .Þ be any element of
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there exists a bijection u : Xn ! X ¼
Q1
k¼1X k deﬁned by uðvÞ ¼ v!.
Deﬁnition 3.1. The above-mentioned mapping is called the measurized mapping of Xn.Deﬁnition 3.2. Suppose that A 2 F(S), nP 2, deﬁne
snðAÞ ¼
Xn1
i¼0
i
n 1 l ½A in1
 
¼
Xn1
i¼1
i
n 1 l ½A in1
 
;
where ½A i
n1
¼ f v!2 R1n j v!¼ uðvÞ; vðAÞ ¼ in1 ; v 2 Xng is the class of in1-models of A,
i = 0,1, . . . ,n  1. Then sn(A) is called the n-valued truth degree of A.Example 3.3. (i) snðpÞ ¼
Pn1
i¼1
i
n1 l ½p in1
 
¼Pn1i¼1 in1  1n ¼ 1nðn1ÞPn1i¼1 i ¼ 12.
(ii) Let p and q be two different propositional variables, and v 2 Xn, then vðp ^ qÞ ¼ in1
iff vðpÞ ¼ in1 and vðqÞP in1, or vðqÞ ¼ in1 and vðpÞ > in1 ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n 1Þ. Since there
are a total of n2 pairs of (v(p),v(q)) and among then only 2(n  i)  1 v’s imply that
vðp ^ qÞ ¼ in1, hence
l ½p ^ q i
n1
 
¼ 2ðn iÞ  1
n2
; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n 1.
Therefore snðp ^ qÞ ¼
Pn1
i¼1
i
n1 l ½p ^ q in1
 
¼ 1n2ðn1Þ
Pn1
i¼1 i½2ðn iÞ  1 ¼ 2n16n .
By a similar analysis one can obtain
l ½p _ q i
n1
 
¼ 2iþ 1
n2
; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n 1.
Therefore snðp _ qÞ ¼
Pn1
i¼1
i
n1  2iþ1n2 ¼ 4nþ16n .
(iii) Consider the truth degree sn(p! q) of p! q. Note that
vðp ! qÞ ¼ vðpÞ ! vðqÞ ¼ R0ðvðpÞ; vðqÞÞ ¼
1; vðpÞ 6 vðqÞ;
ð1 vðpÞÞ _ vðqÞ; vðpÞ > vðqÞ:

Let v(p! q) = 1, then v(p) 6 v(q), there a total of ½nþ ðn 1Þ þ    þ 1 ¼ nðnþ1Þ
2
pairs
(v(p),v(q)) such that v(p! q) = 1. Next let vðp ! qÞ ¼ in1 ð1 6 i 6 n 2Þ, equivalently,ð1 vðpÞÞ _ vðqÞ ¼ in1 and v(p) > v(q). It is easy to check that there are a total of
(n  1) solutions if i ¼ n1
2
and n is odd, (2i + 1) ones if i < n1
2
and n is odd, 2(n  1  i)
ones if i > n1
2
and n is odd, and (2i + 1) ones if i 6 n1
2
and n is even, 2(n  1  i) ones
if i > n1
2
and n is even. Thus, if n is odd, then
snðp ! qÞ ¼ 1n2 	
nðnþ 1Þ
2
þ 1
2
	 n 1
n2
þ
Xn12 1
i¼1
i
n 1 
2iþ 1
n2
þ
Xn2
i¼n12 þ1
i
n 1 
2ðn 1 iÞ
n2
¼ 6n
2 þ n 1
8n2
;
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snðp ! qÞ ¼ 1n2 	
nðnþ 1Þ
2
þ
Xn21
i¼1
i
n 1 
2iþ 1
n2
þ
Xn2
i¼n2
i
n 1 
2ðn 1 iÞ
n2
¼ 6n
2  5n 2
8nðn 1Þ .
(iv) Now, to calculate the truth degree sn(p
2) of p2 ¼ :ðp ! :pÞ in Ln. 8v 2 Xn, let
vðp2Þ ¼ in1, i.e., vðpÞ  vðpÞ ¼ in1 ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n 1, where  is the nilpotent minimum
t-norm adjoint to the R0 implication operator deﬁned above. Hence if iP ½n12 þ 1, then
vðp2Þ ¼ in1 iff vðpÞ ¼ in1, otherwise v(p2) = 0. Thus we get
l ½p2 i
n1
 
¼
1
n ; iP ½n12 þ 1;
0; 1 6 i < ½n1
2
þ 1:
(
Therefore
snðp2Þ ¼
Xn1
i¼1
i
n 1 l ½p
2 i
n1
 
¼
Xn1
i¼½n12 þ1
i
n 1 
1
n
¼
3n1
8n ; n is odd,
3n2
8ðn1Þ ; n is even.
(
(v) It is left to the reader to check that snðp1 ^ p2 ^    ^ pmÞ ¼ 1nmðn1Þ
Pn1
k¼1k
m.
In the sequel, we give the following lemma summarizing the basic properties of the truth
degree function sn, and the proof is obvious and omitted.Lemma 3.4. Suppose A and B are formulas in Ln, then
(i) A is a tautology iff sn(A) = 1.
(ii) A is a contradiction iff sn(A) = 0.
(iii) snð:AÞ ¼ 1 snðAÞ.
(iv) If ‘nA! B holds, then sn(A) 6 sn(B).
(v) If A and B are logically equivalent, then sn(A) = sn(B).
(vi) If define
qnðA;BÞ ¼ 1 snððA ! BÞ ^ ðB ! AÞÞ; A;B 2 F ðSÞ.
then qn is a pseudo-metric on F(S).From Lemma 3.4 one may see that the truth degree function sn looks like a valuation of
F(S), but it is not the case. Indeed, as shown in Example 3.3(i) and (ii), sn does not com-
mute with the min-conjunction. sn is actually an intrinsic means to measure the size of the
model class of a formula.
What is the relationship between the two truth degree functions sn and s when n con-
verges to inﬁnity? The following limit theorem answers the above question.
Theorem 3.5 (Limit theorem). "A 2 F(S),
lim
n!1
snðAÞ ¼ sðAÞ.
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2, the set of its dis-
continuity points is of zero-measure. So the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 of [15]
and is omitted. hExample 3.6. Use Deﬁnition 2.8 to calculate s(p), s(p ^ q), s(p _ q), s(p! q) and s(p2),
and compare with the corresponding results obtained in Example 3.3.
Solution. (i) sðpÞ ¼ R 10 xdx ¼ 12.
(ii) sðp ^ qÞ ¼ R 10 R 10 x^ ydxdy ¼ R 10 R x0 ydxdy þ R 10 R 1x xdxdy ¼ 13. Similarly, sðp _ qÞ ¼ 23.
(iii) sðp ! qÞ ¼ R 1
0
R 1
0
ðx ! yÞdxdy ¼ R 1
0
R 1
x dxdy þ
R 1
0
R x
0
ð1 xÞ _ y dxdy ¼ 3
4
.
(vi) sðp2Þ ¼ R 1
0
x1 dx ¼ R 11
2
dx ¼ 3
8
.
These results together with the corresponding ones of Example 3.3 further verify
Theorem 3.5.4. Consistency degrees of theories based on deduction theorems in Ln
First let us take an analysis on the inconsistency of a theory in Ln. Suppose that C is a
theory and C is inconsistent, then the contradiction 0 is a consequence of C, that is to say,
C‘n0 holds. It follows from the generalized deduction theorem that there exists a ﬁnite
string of formulas A1, . . . ,Am 2 C such that ‘nA21&A22&   &A2m ! 0 holds, i.e., the formula
A21&   &A2m ! 0 is a theorem of Ln. By the completeness theorem of Ln;A21&   &A2m ! 0
is a tautology, then the truth degree snðA21&   &A2m ! 0Þ ¼ 1 following from Lemma 3.4.
Conversely, if there is a ﬁnite sequence of formulas A1, . . . ,Am 2 C such that the truth
degree snðA21&   &A2n ! 0Þ of A21&   &A2m ! 0 is equal to 1, then again following from
Lemma 3.4, A21&   &A2m ! 0 is tautology, equivalently, ‘nA21&   &A2m ! 0 holds, hence
by the generalized deduction theorem of Ln;C‘n0 holds, and so C is inconsistent. From
the above analysis, in order to decide whether a given theory C is inconsistent or not, it suf-
ﬁces to calculate the truth degrees snðA21&   &A2m ! 0Þ of all possible formulas of the form
A21&   &A2m ! 0 where A1, . . . ,Am 2 C. If the truth degree of such a formula is equal to 1,
then C is inconsistent. However, it may happen during our reasoning that we obtain more
truth degrees of such formulas from C and it is necessary to decide, which of them should be
taken as the result. By the completeness theorem of Ln, the larger the truth degrees of such
formulas are, the closer C is to be inconsistent. Therefore, it is natural and reasonable for us
using the supremum of truth degrees of all formulas with the form A21&   &A2m ! 0, where
A1, . . . ,Am 2 C, to measure the inconsistency of C.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Suppose that C is a theory, 2(C) is the set of all ﬁnite subsets of C,
R = {A1, . . . ,Am} 2 2(C). Let
R2 ! 0 ¼ A
2
1&   &A2m ! 0; m > 0;
0; m ¼ 0;
(
and deﬁne
lnðCÞ ¼ supfsnðR2 ! 0Þ j R 2 2ðCÞg.
126 H. Zhou et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 43 (2006) 117–132Then ln(C) is called the degree of entailment of 0 from C, or say, 0 is a consequence of C in
the degree ln(C), we may also call it the degree of inconsistency of C.Remark 4.2. (i) "A, B 2 F(S), A&B! C is equivalent to B&A! C because & is commu-
tative, hence the deﬁnition of R2 ! 0 does not depend on the order of Ai’s.
(ii) Since sn(A&B! C)P sn(A! C) ^ sn(B! C), one easily gets that snðR21 ! 0Þ 6
snðR22 ! 0Þ, where R1  R2, R1, R2 2 2(C).
(iii) Suppose that C is ﬁnite, then it follows from (ii) that lnðCÞ ¼ snðC2 ! 0Þ.
(iv) Deﬁnition 4.1 indeed oﬀers a method to evaluate the extent to which the
contradiction 0 is a consequence of the theory C. For example, suppose that C is ﬁnite and
ln(C) = 1, then it is to say 0 is (100%) a consequence of C. Of course, if C is inﬁnite then
‘‘ln(C) = 1’’ may not imply that 0 is (100%) a consequence of C (please see Example
4.4(iii)), but in a very high degree converging to 1.
(v) If we introduce in Ln the concept of divergence degrees of theories by the truth
degrees of formulas as done in [16]:
divnðCÞ ¼ supfqnðA;BÞ j A;B 2 DðCÞg;
where qn is deﬁned in Lemma 3.4. Then we can prove that in Ln; divnðCÞ ¼ lnðCÞ (please
see the proof of Theorem 3.8 of [20]). But in the present paper we prefer ln(C) because it
not only has a very strong intuitive meaning-the extent to which C is inconsistent, but also
it can be easily generalized to give a method of graded reasoning in Ln.
The calculation of ln(C) can be simpliﬁed as follows:
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that C is a theory in Ln, then
lnðCÞ ¼ 1 inffsnðA21&   &A2mÞ j A1; . . . ;Am 2 C;m 2 Ng.Proof. It follows from the fact :A and A ! 0 are logically equivalent that
lnðCÞ ¼ supfsnðA21&   &A2m ! 0Þ j A1; . . .Am 2 C;m 2 Ng
¼ supfsnð:ðA21&   &A2mÞÞ j A1; . . . ;Am 2 C;m 2 Ng
¼ supf1 snðA21&   &A2mÞ j A1; . . . ;Am 2 C;m 2 Ng
¼ 1 inffsnðA21&   &A2mÞ j A1; . . . ;Am 2 C;m 2 Ng.
The proof is completed. hExample 4.4. Calculate ln(C) for (i) C = ;, (ii) C = {p}, (iii) C = S = {p1,p2, . . .}.
Solution. (i) If C = ;, then 8R 2 2ðCÞ;R ¼ ;;R2 ! 0 ¼ 0, and so snðR2 ! 0Þ ¼ 0. Hence
ln(C) = 0.
(ii) Let C = {p}, then it follows from Lemma 4.3 and Example 3.3 that
lnðCÞ ¼ snðC2 ! 0Þ ¼ snðp2 ! 0Þ ¼ 1 snðp2Þ ¼
5nþ1
8n ; n is odd,
5n6
8ðn1Þ ; n is even:
(
H. Zhou et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 43 (2006) 117–132 127(iii) Since ‘ ðp21&   &p2mÞ ! ðp1 ^    pmÞ holds in L, it also holds in the n-valued
extension Ln of L. Following from Lemma 3.4 and Example 3.3,
snðp21&   &p2mÞ 6 snðp1 ^    ^ pmÞ ¼
1
nmðn 1Þ
Xn1
k¼1
km ! 0 ðm!1Þ.
Therefore
lnðSÞ ¼ 1 inffsnðp21&   &p2mÞ j p1; . . . ; pm 2 S;m 2 Ng
P 1 inffsnðp1 ^    ^ pmÞ j p1; . . . ; pm 2 S;m 2 Ng
¼ 1 inf 1
nmðn 1Þ
Xn1
k¼1
km j m 2 N
( )
¼ 1
and so ln(S) = 1.
But C = S is not inconsistent. In fact, suppose on the contrary that C is inconsistent,
then C‘n0. Hence it follows from the generalized deduction theorem of Ln that there exist
p1, . . . ,pm 2 C such that ‘np21&   &p2m ! 0 holds. Choose v 2 Xn such that v(p1) =    =
v(pm) = 1, then vðp21&   &p2mÞ ¼ ðvðp1Þ  vðp1ÞÞ      ðvðpmÞ  vðpmÞÞ ¼ 1. Thus
vðp21&   &p2m ! 0Þ ¼ 1! 0 ¼ 0, contradicting the fact that p21&   &p2m ! 0 is a theo-
rem. This completes the proof.Theorem 4.5. Let C be a theory in Ln. If C is inconsistent then ln(C) = 1, but not vice versa.Proof. The proof is straightforward and so omitted. For counterexample, please see
Example 4.4(iii). h
From the analysis at the beginning of this section, we know that ln(C) is an ideal index
to measure the inconsistency degree of C. Perhaps this hints the idea that one may deﬁne
the consistency degree consistn(C) of C to be 1  ln(C), but this idea has a shortcoming
that it could not distinguish theories with ln(C) = 1 from inconsistent theories as shown
in Example 4.4 and Theorem 4.5. Hence we have to revise the seemingly reasonable def-
inition consistn(C) = 1  ln(C).
Deﬁnition 4.6. Suppose that C is a theory of Ln, i.e., C  F(S), deﬁne
inðCÞ ¼ maxf½snðA21&   &A2m ! 0Þ j A1; . . . ;Am 2 C;m 2 Ng;
and in(C) is called the polar index of C in Ln.Theorem 4.7. Suppose that C is a theory of Ln. Then
(i) C is consistent iff in(C) = 0,
(ii) C is inconsistent iff in(C) = 1.
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in(C) 2 {0,1}, it sufﬁces to prove (ii). Suppose that C is inconsistent, i.e., C ‘ 0 then by
the generalized deduction theorem of Ln, there exist A1, . . . ,Am 2 C such that
A21&   &A2m ! 0 is a theorem, and it follows from the completeness theorem of Ln
and Lemma 3.4 that snðA21&   &A2m ! 0Þ ¼ 1. So ½snðA21&   &A2m ! 0Þ ¼ 1 and
in(C) = 1. Conversely, if in(C) = 1, then there exist A1, . . . ,Am 2 C such that snðA21&   &
A2m ! 0Þ ¼ 1. Again by completeness theorem of Ln and Lemma 3.4, ‘nA21&   &A2m ! 0
holds. Therefore C‘n0 holds by MP 2m times, and hence C is inconsistent. hDeﬁnition 4.8. Suppose that C is a theory of Ln, deﬁne
consistnðCÞ ¼ 1 1
2
lnðCÞ 1þ inðCÞð Þ
and call consistn(C) the consistency degree of C in Ln.Theorem 4.9. Suppose that C is a theory of Ln, then
(i) C is a useless theory, i.e., all members of D(C) are tautologies, if and only if
consistn(C) = 1.
(ii) C is consistent if and only if 1
2
6 consistnðCÞ 6 1.
(iii) C is consistent and ln(C) = 1 if and only if consistnðCÞ ¼ 12.
(iv) C is inconsistent if and only if consistn(C) = 0.Proof. (i) It is easy to check that C is a useless theory iff ln(C) = 0, hence (i) holds.
(ii) On account of Theorem 4.7(i) C is consistent iff in(C) = 0, and this is equivalent to
1
2 6 consitnðCÞ ¼ 1 12 lnðCÞ 6 1.
(iii) It follows directly from Deﬁnition 4.8 and Theorem 4.7(i).
(iv) Suppose that C is inconsistent, then ln(C) = 1 by Theorem 4.5 and in(C) = 1 by
Theorem 4.7(ii). Hence consistnðCÞ ¼ 1 12	 1	 ð1þ 1Þ ¼ 0. Conversely, if C is consis-
tent, then by (ii) 12 6 consistnðCÞ 6 1, a contradiction. h
It must be stressed that item (i) says C is a useless theory iﬀ the elements of D(C) are
tautologies. This means that, passing through the completeness theorem, all the conse-
quences of C are logical theorems, or all the special axioms of C are indeed logical theo-
rems. In this sense each theory with consistn(C) = 1 is quite useless.
Example 4.10. One has got in Example 4.4 that lnð;Þ ¼ 0; lnðfpgÞ ¼ 5nþ18n if n is odd,
lnðfpgÞ ¼ 5n68ðn1Þ if n is even, and ln(S) = 1. It is routine to check that these three theories
are all consistent. This means that in(;) = in({p}) = in(S) = 0. Hence one easily gets that
consistnð;Þ ¼ 1;
consistnðfpgÞÞ ¼
11n1
16n ; n is odd,
11n10
16ðn1Þ ; n is even,
(
consistnðSÞ ¼ 1
2
.
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vðpÞ  ð1 vðpÞÞ ¼ 0Þ and p&:p 2 DðCÞ, C is inconsistent by the standard completeness
theorem of Ln. Hence consistn(C) = 0.Remark 4.11. Corresponding to the Limit Theorem (Theorem 3.5) in Section 3, here is a
similar limit theorem for ln(C):
lim
n!1
lnðCÞ ¼ lðCÞ.
But limn!1inðCÞ ¼ iðCÞ does not hold. As for the deﬁnitions of l(C) and i(C) in L we refer
to [20].5. Methods of graded reasoning in Ln
As has been pointed out in Remark 4.2(iv), Deﬁnition 4.1 indeed oﬀers a method to
evaluate the extent to which the contradiction 0 is a consequence of a theory C.
If we replace 0 by a general formula A, then the corresponding analysis at the beginning
of Section 4 also holds in Ln. Hence we get a method to evaluate the extent to which a
formula A is a consequence of a given theory C.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Suppose that C is a theory of Ln; 2ðCÞ is the set of all ﬁnite subsets of C,
R = {A1, . . . ,Am} 2 2(C), and A 2 F(S) is a formula. Let
R2 ! A ¼ A
2
1&   &A2m ! A; m > 0;
A; m ¼ 0;
(
and deﬁne
lnðA;CÞ ¼ supfsnðR2 ! AÞ j R 2 2ðCÞg.
Then ln(A,C) is called the degree of entailment of A from C, or say A is a consequence of C
in the degree ln(A,C).
Note that Remark 4.2 also holds when 0 is replaced by A, and clearly lnð0;CÞ ¼ lnðCÞ.
Similar to Theorem 4.5, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2. Let A be not a theorem of Ln and let C be a theory of Ln. If A is a consequence
of C then ln(A,C) = 1, but not vice versa.
Clearly Theorem 4.5 is a special case of Theorem 5.2. It is not diﬃcult to check
that sup{sn(R
2! A)jR 2 2(C)}P sup{sn(p2 ^    ^ pm ! p1)jm 2 N} = 1, where C =
{p2 ^    ^ pmjm = 2,3, . . .} and A = p1, and it is routine to show that A 62 DðCÞ. Theorem
5.2 tells us that ln(A,C) = 1 does not mean A is (100%) a consequence of C.
Deﬁnition 5.3. Suppose that C is a theory of Ln;A 2 F ðSÞ. Deﬁne
inðA;CÞ ¼ maxf½R2 ! A j R 2 2ðCÞg;
and call in(A,C) the polar index of C w.r.t. A.
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(i) A 2 D(C), i.e., A is a consequence of C if and only if in(A,C) = 1.
(ii) A 62 DðCÞ if and only if in(A,C) = 0.Proof. The proof is trivial. hDeﬁnition 5.5. Let C be a theory of Ln;A 2 F ðSÞ, deﬁne
lnðA;CÞ ¼
1
2
lnðA;CÞð1þ inðA;CÞÞ;
and also call lnðA;CÞ the degree of entailment of A from C, or say A is consequence of C in
the degree lnðA;CÞ.Theorem 5.6. Suppose that C is a theory of Ln;A 2 F ðSÞ, then
(i) A 2 D(C) if and only if lnðA;CÞ ¼ 1.
(ii) A 62 DðCÞ if and only if 1
2
snðAÞ 6 lnðA;CÞ 6 12.
(iii) A 62 DðCÞ and ln(A,C) = 1 if and only if lnðA;CÞ ¼ 12 .Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 4.9 and so omitted. h
In the following, we give another method of graded reasoning in Ln by evaluating the
distance of A to D(C).
Deﬁnition 5.7. Let C be a theory of Ln;A 2 F ðSÞ. Put
a ¼ qnðA;DðCÞÞ ¼ inffqnðA;BÞ j B 2 DðCÞg;
and call A a consequence of C with error a.
The following theorem reveals the relationship between qn and ln.
Theorem 5.8. Let C be a theory of Ln;A 2 F ðSÞ, then
qnðA;DðCÞÞP 1 lnðA;CÞ.Proof
qnðA;DðCÞÞ ¼ inffqnðA;BÞ j B 2 DðCÞg
¼ inff1 snððA ! BÞ ^ ðB ! AÞÞ j B 2 DðCÞg
¼ 1 supfsnððA ! BÞ ^ ðB ! AÞÞ j B 2 DðCÞg
P 1 supfsnðB ! AÞ j B 2 DðCÞg
P 1 supfsnðA21&   &A2m ! AÞ j A1; . . . ;Am 2 C;m 2 Ng
¼ 1 lnðA;CÞ: 
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qn(A,D(C)) = 0 but A 62 DðCÞ, then lnðA;CÞ ¼ 12 .Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 5.8, Deﬁnition 5.5 and Theorem 5.6. h6. Concluding remarks
In the present paper we ﬁrstly extended the idea of [15] to Ln and we proposed the
concept of truth degrees of formulas, then based on deduction theorem, completeness
theorem, we deﬁned a consistency function measuring the extent to which a general theory
is inconsistent. Two methods of graded reasoning in Ln were given and the relationship
between them was discussed.
So far, we have successfully established the theory of consistency degrees of theories in
classical two-valued and fuzzy logic systems, and the n-valued extension Ln of the formal
deductive system L. It must be stressed that the presented results can be easily adapted to
any standard complete ﬁnite-valued logic system such as Łn (which is standard complete
with respect to the standard MVn-chain, see [2]). More precisely, in Łn we only need to
deﬁne Rn ! 0 ¼ An1&   &Anm ! 0 if m > 0, and Rn ! 0 ¼ 0 otherwise, instead of
R2 ! 0 deﬁned in Ln, because it is easy to check that the generalized deduction theorem:
C [ {A} ‘ B iﬀ C ‘ An! B, holds in Łn. The following work is the same as in Ln. For
example, we can also prove Theorems 4.5, 4.7, and 4.9. Maybe some computation of ln
will be altered, such as lnðfpgÞ ¼ 1 1n in Łn, which is not equal to the expression of
ln({p}) in Ln.
Moreover, how to extend the concept of consistency degrees of theories and the method
of graded reasoning to predicate logic systems and to the more general fuzzy logic system
with graded syntax given in [7] would be a more attractive research.
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